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in the matter are abbreviated as "TR.," followed by the pag^ and line number of the 
relevant material. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over the present matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103 (2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding $7,000 to Mr. 
Anderson where the court made findings by clear and convincing evidence that the 
$7,000 came to Ms. Anderson from the states of California and Nevada to help her pay 
for expenses associated with caring for the parties' adopted) children and Ms. Anderson 
no longer had custody of the children for whom the $7,000 was paid? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Ms. Anderson incorrectly frames the issue and 
incorrectly states the standard of review. This issue does npt involve interpreting binding 
case law as she claims. The sole issue presented here is whether the district court abused 
its discretion in awarding $7,000 for the support of the parties' children to Mr. Anderson. 
This is because all of Ms. Anderson's due process rights were observed. Furthermore, 
Ms. Anderson mischaracterizes the law concerning the preservation of constitutional 
issues for appellate review. Such issues are not "always preserved" as she contends. 
Rather, constitutional issues are only considered for the fir$t time on appeal if the 
appellant can show that the trial court committed plain error concerning constitutional 
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rights or that exceptional circumstances exist. Pitt v. Tar on, 2009 UT App 113, ^  7, FN 
7,210P.3d962. 
The trial court's award of child support is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, Tf 9, 169 P.3d 754. Furthermore, a party 
that assails factual findings, such as those that underly an award of child support, must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the findings, and then demonstrate that all evidence 
in the record is legally insufficient to sustain the finding, even when viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Id. at f 17. This requires the 
appellant to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced which supports the very findings [she] resists." Id. The appellant 
must then demonstrate how each bit of evidence in the record demonstrates that each 
contested finding is clearly erroneous, even when viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the findings. Id. 
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering Ms. Anderson to pay 
Mr. Anderson's attorney's fees incurred in connection with preparing for the 1/20/09 
hearing pursuant to the inherent power of the court to manage the affairs of its 
proceedings, where the court had once previously granted a continuance on this hearing 
due to counsel's failure to appear despite proper notice, and the court had previously 
noted Ms. Andersons' repeated failure to appear despite proper notice? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of the standard of review of a district 
court's exercise of its inherent power is an issue of first impression of Utah. This is not 
altogether surprising in light of how few Utah cases discuss this source of the court's 
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power to govern its day-to-day affairs. This court is not without guidance, however. 
Cases involving discretionary functions similar to the inherent power are reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT 4pp 154, ^  9, 214 P.3d 865 
(stating that the trial court's decision to bifurcate a trial fall^ within its inherent power to 
manage its docket and is therefore reviewed for an abuse ofl discretion). Furthermore, as 
the Utah Supreme Court stated nearly a century ago, 
It is undoubtedly true that courts of general andl superior jurisdiction 
possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. 
Among these are the power to punish for contempt, to make, modify, 
and enforce rules for the regulation of the business before the court.. 
. . Such inherent powers of courts are necessary to the proper 
discharge of their duties.. . . [U]nless . . . prescribed [by statute], a 
constitutional court of general and superior jurisdiction may 
exercise such inherent powers and summary jurisdiction as the 
necessity of the case may require, and in manner comporting with a 
proper discharge of its duties in the premises. 
In re Evans, 130 P. 217 (Utah 1913) (emphasis added). Ah appeal to other jurisdictions 
discloses that matters committed to the inherent power of the court are reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, ^83 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 
1993) ("District courts generally are afforded great discretion regarding trial procedure 
applications (including control of the docket and parties), ^nd their decisions are 
reviewed only for an abuse of discretion/'); Heinle v. Heinle, 111 N.W.2d 590, Tj 30 
(N.D. 2010) ("A district court has the inherent authority to sanction a litigant for 
misconduct, and such sanctions may include paying the other party's attorney fees. 
Sanctions based on this inherent power will be overturned bn appeal only on a showing 
of abuse of discretion.") (internal quotations and citations emitted); Chambers v. NASCO, 
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Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 51,111 S.Ct. 2133, 2136, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (finding no abuse of 
discretion in resorting to the district court's inherent power to award attorney's fees as a 
sanction for misconduct). 
Indeed, Ms. Anderson concedes the standard of review when she frames the issue 
as whether or not the district court abused its discretion in ordering Ms. Anderson to pay 
attorney's fees. 
ISSUE 3: Did the district court abuse its discretion in its decision to hold Ms. 
Anderson in contempt of court on the court commissioner's recommendation and on 
factual findings it made and memorialized in orders entered in the case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A district court's exercise of its contempt power is 
subject to review for abuse of discretion. State v. Clark 2005 UT 75, \ 18, 124 P.3d 235. 
The trial court's findings of fact in support of its finding of contempt are reviewed under 
a clearly erroneous standard. Id. at % 15. To challenge such findings of fact, the 
appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings, and then demonstrate 
that all evidence in the record is legally insufficient to sustain the finding, even when 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Id. at f 17. 
This requires the appellant to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced which supports the very findings [she] resists." 
Id. 
ISSUE 4: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering an order on October 
27. 2009 over an objection to form filed by Ms. Anderson on October 9, 2009? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Interpreting its own order is a matter committed to 
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the discretion of the trial court and is reversed only on a shoeing of a clear abuse of 
discretion. Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ^  9, 179 P.3d 786. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Disposition of the questions raised in this appeal will rely heavily, if not 
exclusively, on the procedural history of the case. Accordingly, following is a summary 
of the relevant hearings and orders. Because this case has ap involved procedural history 
(the district court's docket is currently in excess of 30 page$ long), much of the 
procedural history is omitted from the following list for the convenience of the reader. 
• 11/05/07: Petition filed. R. 4. 
• 4/28/08: Order to Show Cause (OSC) issued by the court. R. 169-70. 
• 5/12/08: OSC served on Ms. Anderson. Service was personal. R. 182. 
• 5/28/08: OSC hearing. Ms. Anderson failed to appear. Matter continued until 
6/11/08. R. 197. 
6/11/08: Hearing on the continued OSC. Ms. Ander$on failed to appear. R. 425-
26. OSC hearing continued until 7/14/08. 'jThe court stated that if Ms. 
Anderson failed to appear a warrant would issue. Id. 
• 7/14/08: The court found Ms. Anderson to be in contempt. The court stayed 
imposition of sanctions at this time to affonfl Ms. Anderson the 
opportunity to come into compliance with previous orders of the court. 
The matter was continued until 9/08/08 for a review hearing. Ms. 
Anderson advised that her presence was required at the 9/08/08 hearing, 
• 
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and that if she failed to appear, a warrant would issue. The court reserved 
the issue of attorney's fees. R. 542-43. 
9/08/08: The court imposed sanctions on Ms. Anderson for her contempt of court. 
Specifically, the court entered a finding that Ms. Anderson does not come 
before the court with clean hands. Further sanctions were not imposed 
because the court was concerned that doing so might restrict her ability to 
provide for the children. R. 727-28. 
10/17/08: Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) entered. R 808-09. The 
court revoked Ms. Anderson's custodial rights to the parties' children and 
awarded custody to Mr. Anderson. R. 809. The court awarded the 
special master medical power of attorney for the minor children. Id. The 
court also ordered that all funds Ms. Anderson was at that time receiving 
from the states of Nevada and/or California to be directed to Mr. 
Anderson to be used for the childrens' support. R. 808. 
10/27/08: Hearing to make permanent the TRO. The primary purpose of this 
hearing and the injunction was to determine custody of the children. Ms. 
Anderson was ordered to forward the sum of $7,000 immediately to Mr. 
Anderson. R. 1003; 1407-08, ]ffi 2-4. This sum represents money 
received from the states of California and Nevada to pay for the needs of 
the parties' adopted children. R. 1002-03. 
12/15/08: Hearing on Mr. Anderson's OSC scheduled, but not held. Counsel for 
Ms. Anderson failed to appear despite notice of the hearing mailed to 
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counsel on 12/5/08. Hearing continued until| 1/20/09. The court noted 
that the hearing notice specified that failure to appear could result in Ms. 
Anderson's pleadings being stricken. After waiting 25 minutes without 
hearing from counsel or from Ms. Andersonand noting that this was not 
the first time that Ms. Anderson and/or her qounsel had been significantly 
late, the court struck Ms. Anderson's pleadings and entered her default. 
R. 1134-35. 
• 1/20/09: Hearing on Mr. Anderson's OSC scheduled] On counsel for Ms. 
Anderson's representation that he had insufficient time to prepare for the 
hearing, Ms. Anderson was given an additidnal 10 days to supplement her 
Motion to Strike the OSC. Counsel for Mr. Anderson was present and 
prepared to proceed on all issues noticed for hearing. Further hearing 
scheduled to hear Mr. Anderson's OSC, M^ Anderson's objection to the 
form of the 10/27/09 Order, Ms. Anderson'^ Motion to Set Aside Default, 
and any other motions properly brought before the court in a timely 
manner by 2/23/09. The court awarded Mr J Anderson his attorney's fees 
incurred in connection with preparing for tliis hearing. R. 1210-11. 
• 2/23/09: Hearing on several motions held. Mr. Anderson's OSC was premised on 
Ms. Anderson's failure to undertake effortsi to file an amended tax return 
timely as ordered by the court at the 10/27/08 hearing; failure to deliver 
$7,000 to Mr. Anderson as ordered by the court at the 10/27/08 hearing; 
failure to deliver personal property of the children and other items to Mr. 
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Anderson as ordered by the court at the 10/27/08 hearing. The court 
reviewed the file, heard argument of counsel, and then declined to 
entertain Ms. Anderson's Motion to Set Aside Default until she brought 
herself into compliance with previous court orders. Implicit in this ruling 
is a finding that Ms. Anderson had not complied with the court's orders. 
R. 1252. Ms. Anderson was advised that her motion to set aside the 
default would not be considered until she came into compliance with the 
orders of the court specifically identified in the order. R. 1252; 1415-17. 
Ms. Anderson was also advised that she was free to file a motion to set 
aside the default with an accompanying affidavit if and when Ms. 
Anderson came into compliance with these orders. R. 1252; 1416-17. 
• 6/02/09: Evidentiary hearing scheduled. The hearing was continued. Counsel for 
Ms. Anderson was ordered to prepare an order outlining the issues to be 
presented at the hearing. The matter was set for 8/10/09. Ms. Anderson 
subsequently moved for a continuance, which was granted. The hearing 
was set for 8/18/09. R. 1384 
• 8/18/09: Evidentiary hearing held before the district court. Counsel for Ms. 
Anderson stated that he forgot to prepare the order outlining the issues to 
be presented as he was previously ordered to do. TR. August 18, 2009 
Evidentiary Hearing, 2:23-3:5. The issues to be presented were Ms. 
Anderson's objection to the Order issued pursuant to the 1/20/09 hearing 
and Ms. Anderson's objection to the Recommendation and Order entered 
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pursuant to the 2/23/09 hearing. At the hearing, the court declined the 
invitation to reverse the Commissioner's recommendation that Mr. 
Anderson be awarded attorney's fees awarded at the 1/20/09 hearing. R. 
1462. The court also made the following findings, now memorialized in 
the Order and Judgment (Hearing date August 18, 2009), entered on 
October 27, 2009 (R. 1480-1581) over Ms. Anderson's objection, filed 
October 9, 2009(R. 1474-77): 
o That these attorney's fees were awarded as a sanction for Ms. 
Anderson's failure to appear and counsel's failure to appear on 
12/15/08. See Order and Judgment (Hearing Date August 18, 2009) 
R. 1579,1(2. 
o That notice of the 12/15/08 hearing was given on three separate 
occasions and was proper. See id. 
o That Ms. Anderson knew about the order that she deliver $7,000 to 
Mr. Anderson; that the money was delivered to her a few days after 
the TRO was issued and served; and that Ms. Anderson failed to 
comply with the court's order. R. 157$, ^ f 8, 9. 
o That counsel for Mr. Anderson mailedl to counsel for Ms. Anderson 
a copy of the Order complete with timfc counter numbers along with 
a copy of the disc from the hearing as he was ordered to do. R. 
1573, If 10. 
o That both Ms. Anderson and her counsel, Mr. Wall, had been 
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lacking in responsibility in how they were participating in this case 
by failing to appear on multiple occasions despite proper notice, 
being found to come before the court with unclean hands, failure to 
comply with valid orders of the court, and by failing to prepare an 
order as directed by the court. R. 1572-73, f 11. 
o Ms. Anderson failed to comply with the court orders in several 
particulars as outlined in the order. R. 1571-72, ^ 16. 
Pursuant to these findings, the court denied Ms. Anderson's objection to 
the Order pursuant to the 1/20/09 hearing, denied Ms. Anderson's 
objection to the order awarding attorney's fees and denied her Motion to 
Set Aside default judgment. R. 1570, % 24. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The nature of the present appeal can be summarized simply. Ms. Anderson is 
unhappy with the result below, a result occasioned by repeated non-attendance of 
hearings by both Ms. Anderson and her counsel, repeated refusal to comply with court 
orders, and coming before the court with unclean hands, and she now requests that this 
court deliver her from the consequences of her actions. Ms. Anderson, apparently 
realizing the difficulty of her position, attempts to frame the issues of this appeal as 
constitutional issues despite the fact that she neither raised the constitutional issue below, 
nor does she make any effort to cite where in the record such constitutional issues were 
preserved for appeal or to show plain error or exceptional circumstances such as would 
justify this court's addressing this issue for the first time on appeal. 
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Similarly, she attempts to frame the issues on appeal ^s legal issues, thus ensuring 
a less demanding standard of review, despite the fact that th^ issues she raises are all 
unquestionably committed to the sound discretion of the tri^l court and are therefore 
subject to the much more rigorous abuse of discretion standard of review. In addition, 
Ms. Anderson attempts to frame a challenge to factual flndihgs as being legal issues to 
excuse her failure to marshal the evidence as she is require^ to do. 
The various orders entered by the district court leave a paper trail detailing how 
Ms. Anderson found herself in her present position. At evefy step, the district court's 
orders are supported by factual findings, outlined in the mihute entries and orders 
themselves. All orders of the district court from which Ms. Anderson appeals arose out 
of Ms. Anderson's conduct and the conduct of her counsel before the court. That being 
the case, the district court was in the best position to judge the credibility and motives of 
the parties involved. The questions raised are therefore all $ubject to an abuse of 
discretion review. 
Furthermore, to the extent that Ms. Anderson's appeal takes issue with orders of 
the court supported by factual findings, she is required to njarshal the evidence and 
demonstrate how the district court's findings were clearly erroneous even when the 
marshaled facts are viewed in the light most friendly to the district court's findings. Ms. 
Anderson makes no attempt to marshal the evidence. Moreover, Ms. Anderson has failed 
to show an abuse of discretion. When boiled down to thein most simple form, Ms. 
Anderson's arguments are that she disagrees with the discretionary decisions of the 
district court below and the factual findings on which they rely. Ms. Anderson has failed 
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to show an abuse of discretion or that the district court's factual findings were clearly 
erroneous. The district court's orders should therefore be upheld in every particular. 
ARGUMENT 
As a prefatory statement, Mr. Anderson respectfully submits that Ms. Anderson's 
attempts to frame the issues misstate the issues, and are thinly-guised attempts to re-
frame discretionary decisions as questions of law, thus ensuring the less rigorous 
correctness standard of review. Ms. Anderson also improperly attempts to raise 
constitutional issues for the first time on appeal. Importantly, Ms. Anderson also fails to 
cite to the record where each issue she now presents to this court was preserved for 
review in the court below as she is required to do under Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(5)(A) 
(2010), nor does she state the grounds upon which she rests in asking this court to hear 
issues raised for the first time on appeal as required by Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(5)(B). 
To guide this court's analysis of Ms. Anderson's arguments on appeal, Mr. 
Anderson's arguments on appeal will track the arguments raised by Ms. Anderson. 
However, Mr. Anderson re-states the issues in a manner that comports with the law and 
with the record below. 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING $7,000 TO MR. ANDERSON FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE 
PARTIES' ADOPTED CHILDREN. 
a. Constitutional issues are not always preserved for appeal. 
Preliminarily, it is important to note that Ms. Anderson makes no citation to where 
in the record the constitutional issue was preserved for appeal as she is required to do. 
See e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, <§ 38, 176 P.3d 464 ("Because Husband 
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raises his waiver argument for the first time on appeal, and fyas failed to cite where in the 
record his argument is preserved, we refuse to address the rr^erits of this claim."); see also 
Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(5)(A) (2010). 
Ms. Anderson incorrectly states that constitutional rights are always preserved for 
appeal. See Brief of Appellant at 2. While it is possible to raise a constitutional issue for 
the first time on appeal, this can only happen on a showing pf plain error by the trial 
court, or a showing that the case involves exceptional circumstances. See e.g., Pitt, 2009 
UT App at % 7, FN 7. 
In order to qualify for review despite failing to preserve the issue below under the 
plain error doctrine, Ms. Anderson must demonstrate that: 1) an error exists; 2) that the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 3) that the error is harmful. State v. 
Gamer, 2008 UT App. 32, \ 14, 177 P.3d 637. 
In the present case, Ms. Anderson makes no claim of plain error. Moreover, even 
if she had, it would necessarily fail because, as explained ih Point lb. below, Ms. 
Anderson's due process rights were observed in every particular. That is to say, no 
constitutional error exists in the record below because Ms. Anderson had her days in 
court; she just failed to attend. Furthermore, the court repeatedly hinted that it was 
willing to hear a motion to set aside the default once Ms. Ajiderson complied with court 
orders and filed the proper motion. See, e.g., R. 1415-17. 
Analysis of the exceptional circumstances exception! to the general rule is not quite 
so clear-cut. However, this court has previously rendered an extensive discussion of the 
meaning of the exceptional circumstances concept that is more than adequate to 
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demonstrate that no exceptional circumstances exist here. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 
(Utah App. 1996) {cert denied, State v. Irwin, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997)). The Irwin court, 
after an extensive review of the cases in which exceptional circumstances were alleged, 
concluded that the concept is "used sparingly, properly reserved for truly exceptional 
situations, for cases-as our Supreme Court has recently recognized-involving rare 
procedural anomalies." Id. at 11 (internal quotations omitted). Interestingly, the cases 
discussed in Irwin involving exceptional circumstances were almost exclusively criminal 
cases involving the liberty interests of the defendant. Id. at 8-11. Notwithstanding this 
fact, the court was clear that the defendant's liberty interests were "just one factor in 
determining whether exceptional circumstances exist." Id. at 9 (citing State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App. 1991)). 
What is clear in light of the Irwin holding is that only the rarest of procedural 
anomalies will trigger the application of the exceptional circumstances concept -
anomalies such as significant changes in the law during the pendency of the action such 
that the party had no reason to raise the constitutional issue below {State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)), or anomalies that could lead to multiple appeals on the same 
issue {State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)), or anomalies that would unfairly 
prevent the defendant from ever being able to present his constitutional issue for appeal 
{Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994)). Id. at 9-11. 
In the present case, Ms. Anderson makes no claim of exceptional circumstances. 
This is not altogether surprising, inasmuch as none exists. While this is perhaps an 
unusual domestic case, there are no such procedural anomalies that would rise to the level 
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of exceptional circumstances as the concept is discussed in Irwin. Furthermore, as 
discussed more fully in Point lb. below, there are no procedural anomalies in the record 
below. Additionally, the due process interests at stake in th^ issue raised on appeal are 
not Ms. Anderson's liberty interests, but are interests in the fnere loss of money. This 
due process interest enjoys far less judicial solicitude than weightier interests, such as 
liberty interests. See Egbert v. Nissan N. America, 2007 U t 64, % 13, 167 P.3d 1058 
(stating that lesser due process interests, such as the "mere lfc>ss of money" do not warrant 
higher due process protection in the form of heightened burden of proof). The record 
simply cannot be read to disclose exceptional circumstances as that term is understood to 
mean in light of the Irwin court's analysis. 
A constitutional challenge was not raised below. M$. Anderson makes no attempt 
to show plain error or exceptional circumstances. Moreovejr, the trial court did not 
commit plain error, and the record below contains no exceptional circumstances. To the 
extent that this issue on appeal relies on a constitutional challenge, it cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal. 
b. Ms. Anderson's due process rights were Observed in every particular. 
Responding to the merits of the first issue on appeal without waiving the argument 
presented in Point la. above, however, Mr. Anderson does (not dispute Ms. Anderson's 
characterization of her due process rights. She is indeed entitled to her day in court. Mr. 
Anderson does not, however, agree that Ms. Anderson was] summarily denied her day in 
court. When this court reads the portions of the record Ms. Anderson cites in her brief in 
support of her argument that she was denied due process, ill is apparent that every 
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opportunity to be heard was extended to Ms. Anderson. 
First, as to the August 18, 2009 hearing, the district court's basis for denying Ms. 
Anderson an evidentiary hearing on the $7,000 judgment was because her pleadings had 
been stricken and her default had been taken. TR. August 18, 2009 at 70:17-71:9. 
Counsel for Ms. Anderson specifically acknowledged this. Id. at 71: 6-9. The reason her 
pleadings had been stricken was her repeated non-attendance to properly noticed 
hearings. R. at 1233-35. In other words, Ms. Anderson was given her day in court; she 
just failed to appear in court on that day. 
Second, as to the February 23, 2009 hearing, Ms. Anderson apparently takes issue 
with the court's refusal to hear evidence on the pro rata portion of the $7,000 received in 
late October of 2008 to which she believed she was entitled. In support of this argument, 
Ms. Anderson's sole citation to the record is to an objection she filed purportedly to the 
form of an order prepared by Mr. Anderson's counsel. Brief of Appellant at 14 (citing 
R. 1267). This portion of the record does nothing to support Ms. Anderson's argument 
because it does nothing to undermine the court's determination that because Ms 
Anderson's pleadings had been stricken and her default entered as a result of her non-
attendance, she had no right to make her argument concerning the $7,000. 
The record amply refutes Ms. Anderson's claim that she was summarily denied 
her right to present evidence at the February 23, 2009 hearing without justification. The 
reason that both the court commissioner and the district court refused to hear argument 
over the $7,000 award was because Ms. Anderson's pleadings had been stricken and her 
default taken: 
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MR. WALL: So we're being denied, then, the hearing on the 
7,000, or the Court just entering a judgment for 7,000? 
THE COURT: Well, the issue is we don't get to that 7,000 if 
there's a default entered. 
MR. WALL: Okay. 
THE COURT: It's not being denied. It's just that I'm finding that 
the default was entered appropriately, and the pleadings were stricken 
appropriately. 
MR. YOUNG: So there is a judgment for $7,000. 
THE COURT: Right, but that's not at issue ariymore, because like 
I say, if a default is entered, then there's no right to apgue that any longer. 
MR. WALL: Right. 
TR. August 18, 2009 70:22-71:9. 
It is also important to note that Ms. Anderson was advised that if and when she 
came into compliance with the court's orders, she would be free to file a motion to set 
aside the default and any other motions properly brought before the court, such as a 
motion for the evidentiary hearing to which she believed sh^ was entitled. R. 1415-17. 
Ms. Anderson never came into compliance with those ordets. As a consequence, her 
default was never set aside, making it impossible for the court to hear the evidence Ms. 
Anderson wanted to put before it. 
In light of these facts, there has been no abuse of discretion. Rather, Ms. 
Anderson was afforded every opportunity to be heard and Ijad ample time to bring herself 
into compliance with the court's orders in order to allow h^r to put whatever question she 
desired before the court, including a motion to set aside the default, which would have 
17 
paved the way to the evidentiary hearing she sought. There is no abuse of discretion to 
be found in the trial court's entry of the order that Ms. Anderson pay $7,000 to Mr. 
Anderson as child support. 
Contrary to her argument on appeal, Ms. Anderson was only denied an 
opportunity to present evidence on a question that was never properly put before the 
court. This is proper procedure, and not a denial of due process. 
c. The award of $7,000 was supported by specific factual findings and 
Ms. Anderson has failed to marshal the evidence. 
The balance of Ms. Anderson's first point on appeal appears to center around a 
contention that the district court "disregarded the facts," or "ignor[ed Mr. Anderson's] 
lack of evidence of money received by [Ms. Anderson]...." Brief of Appellant at p. 14. 
In its purest form, this amounts to a challenge to the court's factual findings in the hopes 
that she might get a second bite at the apple on appeal. However, conclusory statements 
such as those made in Ms. Anderson's brief with scant, non-specific citations to portions 
of the record that do not contain the evidence on which the court based its factual 
findings are woefully inadequate to support a challenge of findings made below. 
The court made several findings supporting its order that Ms. Anderson transfer 
$7,000! to Mr. Anderson with which it would appear Ms. Anderson takes issue. In the 
Recommendation and Order That Ex Parte Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 
1
 Perhaps the saddest point that becomes apparent when one reads between the lines of 
this appeal is that in a case where the most important issue was the best interests of 
several special needs children, Mr. Anderson now finds himself in front of yet another 
court in a dispute over a monetary award, the enforcement of which has never been 
sought. 
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is Permanent (Hearing Date October 27, 2008), the district cpurt made findings on the 
commissioner's recommendation that "[t]here is more than enough evidence before the 
court to conclude that in fact, the TRO should be made perntanent." R. 1409. Pursuant 
to this finding, the district court ordered the $7,000 to be transferred to Mr. Anderson for 
the support of the children. R. 1408. The minute entry fronj the October 27, 2008 
hearing is also instructive. The minute entry reflects that th0 court made findings that 
"[t]here is enough evidence for this Court to grant this ordeu on a permanent basis . . . . 
The $7,000 monthly State support shall be immediately transferred to the father. The 
findings in this case are based on clear and convincing evidence." R. 1002. 
The record also reflects that on July 21, 2009, the district court, on the 
commissioner's recommendation, signed and entered the Recommendation and Order 
(Hearing Date: October 27, 2008). R. 1407-08. The Recommendation and Order was 
premised on the court's findings at the hearing of October ^7, 2008. Id. 
If Ms. Anderson genuinely wishes to challenge the factual findings below, she 
must marshal the evidence. Andrus, 2007 UT App at j^ 9. ^his requires Ms. Anderson to 
comb the record and present in comprehensive and exhaustive fashion every scrap of 
competent evidence on which the district court could have ifeiied in making its findings. 
Id. at T| 17. Once the evidence has been marshaled, Ms. Anderson must demonstrate how 
each bit of evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding, even when viewed in 
the light most friendly to the trial court's findings. Id. 
In the present case, Ms. Anderson has not made eveij the first attempt at 
marshaling the evidence. Her challenges to the trial court's findings cannot be 
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considered and the findings entered below must necessarily stand. 
d. Ms. Anderson has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
The thrust of Ms. Anderson's first issue on appeal appears to arise because she 
disagrees with the court on how much of the $7,000 paid to her for the month of October 
should have been awarded to Mr. Anderson. The trial court's decision concerning child 
support is an equitable decision and is therefore reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Andrus, 2007 UT App at % 9. Likewise, it is important to note that the court's refusal to 
hear evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, 
131. 
Furthermore, as stated above, the reason that the district court did not hear 
evidence on this issue was because Ms. Anderson only attempted to raise this issue after 
her default had been taken. R. 1233-1235; TR. August 18, 2209 at 70:22-71:9. 
Importantly, Ms. Anderson was advised that if and when she came into compliance with 
the court's orders, the court would be disposed to entertain a motion to set aside the 
default, thereby paving the way for the evidentiary hearing she sought. R. 1415-17. The 
record amply discloses that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this child 
support award. 
Finally, even if the district court committed error, it was harmless error. This is 
because Ms. Anderson was afforded every opportunity to bring herself into compliance 
with the court's orders, at which time the court indicated that it would be disposed to hear 
a motion to set aside the default, which would have allowed her to request her evidentiary 
hearing. 
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There is no abuse of discretion in the district court's ffailure to rule on a question 
that was not properly put before it. Ms. Anderson has had aifnple time in which to put the 
questions before the court that she now attempts to litigate before this appellate court. It 
should go without saying that the district court's declining t(^  rule on an issue that was not 
properly before it is not an abuse of discretion. 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH 
PREPARING FOR THE 1/20/09 HEARING TO tylR. ANDERSON, 
a. The award of attorney's fees was not granted pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-3. 
Ms. Anderson does not directly raise the issue of the source of the court's 
authority to award attorney's fees under the circumstances tjiat confronted it at the 
January 20, 2009 hearing. Rather, Ms. Anderson states, without support from the law or 
from the record, that the source of authority was Utah Codel Ann. § 30-3-3 (2010). 
Mr. Anderson notes that even if the award of attorney's fees was granted pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3, that section expressly states that such a grant of attorney's fees 
is discretionary. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2). That being the case, even if Ms. Anderson 
is correct that attorney's fees were granted pursuant to statdte and not the court's inherent 
power, the grant of attorney's fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and not for 
correctness as Ms. Anderson contends in her statement of the issues. Perhaps 
recognizing that this question is committed to the discretion of the trial court, Ms. 
Anderson's heading for Point II in her brief accurately indicates that this decision is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Brief of Appellant p. 15, point heading II. 
Furthermore, Ms. Anderson fails to present any argument that the court abused its 
discretion in awarding fees other than conclusory statements that the court abused its 
discretion and making scant, perfunctory citations to the record. Such ipse dixit 
statements fall well short of being sufficient to establish th^t an abuse of discretion 
occurred 
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However, a review of the orders discloses that the order of attorney's fees was not 
granted pursuant to statute. Rather, fees were awarded as a sanction against Ms. 
Anderson and her counsel as a result of repeated non-attendance at hearings despite more 
than sufficient notice. 
The first question this court must answer is this: What is the source of the district 
court's authority to award attorney's fees under the circumstances before it? When the 
award is considered in context, it is apparent that fees were awarded pursuant to the 
court's inherent power as a sanction against Ms. Anderson and her counsel for their 
repeated non-attendance and lack of preparation for properly noticed hearings. 
Prior to the award of attorney's fees, Ms. Anderson's pleadings had been stricken 
and her default taken. R. 1134-35. Her default was entered as a result of repeated non-
attendance to properly noticed hearings, at a hearing noticed for oral argument, a 
scheduling conference and an OSC on December 15, 2008. Id. She had also been 
ordered to transfer to Mr. Anderson $7,000 for the support of the parties' children. 
R.1002. She had failed to do so. On December 15, 2008, the court held a hearing. Id. 
Ms. Anderson and her counsel failed to appear. Id. This resulted in her pleadings being 
stricken and her default taken. Id. An OSC/contempt hearing was noticed for January 
20, 2009. R. 1137. At the January 20, 2009 OSC hearing, counsel for Ms. Anderson 
sought further continuance because he was not prepared to be heard on that date. This 
3
 Ms. Anderson also makes a request in passing that Mr. Anderson be required to pay Ms. 
Anderson's fees. However, she makes no effort to cite where she preserved this issue 
below. It is not Mr. Anderson's duty, nor is it this court's duty, to comb the record in 
search of where she may have preserved the issue for review. This request should 
therefore be denied. 
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continuance was granted, but the court did award attorney's |fees to Mr. Anderson ufor 
[his] appearance." R. 1211. 
The only reasonable construction of these facts is that the attorney's fee award was 
granted as a sanction for misconduct by Ms. Anderson and Ijer counsel. The source of 
the authority to award attorney's fees is therefore not found in the code as Ms. Anderson 
contends. Any factors ordinarily considered under an award of attorney's fees pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 is therefore inapposite to the present award. 
b. The award of attorney's fees was granted pursuant to the inherent 
power of the court as a sanction against Ms. Anderson and her counsel 
for their repeated non-attendance and lack) of preparation at properly 
noticed hearings. 
When viewed in context, there is little question that tfie award of attorney's fees 
was granted pursuant to the court's inherent power to sanction the waste of judicial 
resources occasioned by a party's improper conduct. 
There is very little case law in Utah concerning the court's inherent power. 
However, the facts of one such case are illuminating on the court's authority to grant 
attorney's fees pursuant to its inherent power. In Griffith v.| Griffith, the Utah Supreme 
Court sustained an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the pourt's inherent power. 1999 
UT 78, If 14, 985 P.2d 255. In Griffith, one of the key issu0s to be litigated at trial was 
Mr. Griffith's voluntary unemployment. Id. at % 3. On the (first day of a bench trial, the 
trial court disclosed to the parties that the court had convened with one of the witnesses 
of the case at the suggestion of the court's physician. Id. Tjhe reason for this 
conversation was that the judge and the witness had a common physical ailment, and the 
23 
witness was currently undergoing a treatment that the trial court was considering. Id. It 
was anticipated that the witness would testify for Ms. Griffith concerning Mr. Griffith's 
voluntary underemployment. Id. After questioning the judge on the morning of the trial, 
both parties concluded that there was no basis for disqualifying the judge and continued 
with the trial. Id. 
On the morning of the second day of trial, however, counsel for Ms. Griffith 
questioned the court's impartiality because the conversation between the judge and the 
witness allegedly contained information that would have been received under oath at 
trial. Id. Counsel for Ms. Griffith therefore requested that testimony from that witness be 
barred. Id. Rather than barring the testimony, the judge recused. Id. After recusing, the 
trial court entered a judgment jointly against Ms. Griffith and her attorney for the 
attorney's fees incurred during the first day of trial and duplicative work that would be 
necessary to prepare for the postponed trial. Id. The judgment was premised on a finding 
that the questioning of the trial court's impartiality on the second day of trial was made in 
bad faith. Id. 
In addition, the trial court had awarded Ms. Griffith attorney's fees incurred in 
connection with defending against a motion to disqualify her attorney that the trial court 
found to be without merit. Id. at ^ 5. 
The award of attorney's fees for both incidents was characterized as being 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. Pro. 11 at both the trial court level and at the court of appeals. 
The supreme court, however, characterized these awards as stemming out of the trial 
court's inherent power. The court stated that the trial court had authority to award 
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attorney's fees incurred in connection with defending against improper actions that 
wasted the court's time and resources and the time and resources of the opposing party. 
A/, at U 16. 
In the present case, the situation presented to the district court was substantially 
the same as that presented to the Griffith court at the trial court level. Ms. Anderson 
and/or her attorney had previously failed to attend hearings Respite proper notice. At the 
January 20, 2009 hearing, while they were present, they wefe unprepared to move 
forward and sought a continuance. R. 1211. The court, recognizing that the waste of 
judicial resources and the resources of Mr. Anderson was occasioned by the conduct of 
Ms. Anderson, awarded Mr. Anderson his "attorneys fees a$ against Deborah Anderson 
for his counsel's preparation and attendance at the hearing c^ f 20 January 2009." R. 1250, 
14. 
The trial court admittedly did not cite the source of its authority to make its order. 
However, when viewed in context, the only reasonable construction of the order is that it 
was an order pursuant to the inherent power of the court to manage its own day-to-day 
affairs. 
c. The court's exercise of its inherent power \i reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. 
The standard of review of the exercise of the court's! inherent power has not been 
discussed in any reported cases on the court's inherent power and is therefore an issue of 
first impression in Utah. However, based on the Griffith court's analysis and on the 
deference appellate courts generally grant to the district courts on matters where the 
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district court has a unique front row seat to the action, there can be little question that the 
standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
In Griffith, the court noted that the award of attorney's fees was supported by 
factual findings below in sustaining the trial court. Id. at fflf 14-16. Additionally, the 
court cited to the Evans court's statement that the trial court possesses certain inherent 
power to govern the affairs of the matters before it. Id. at % 13. Because the exercise of 
such inherent power inevitably involves the trial court's evaluation of the most fair and 
efficient manner of conducting its business, the court's evaluation of the status of cases 
and the attitudes, motives and credibility of the parties before it, the exercise of this 
power can only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Bodell Const. Co. v. Robbins, 
2009 UT 52, ^  35. 215 P.3d 933 (applying an abuse of discretion standard of review to 
the trial court's award of discovery sanctions because the trial court is in the best position 
to judge the status of his or her cases and the attitudes, credibility and motives of the 
parties). Furthermore, "[wjhere the trial court may exercise broad discretion, we presume 
the correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that indicates 
a clear abuse of... discretion." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah Ct. App.1998), 
cert denied 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
Because the exercise of the district court's inherent power necessarily involves the 
district court's appraisal of the parties, their conduct, their demeanor, their motives, etc... 
based on evidence that will not be apparent in a record on appeal, it is only appropriate 
that appellate courts grant district courts deference in how they choose to manage the 
affairs of their courtroom in light of their observations. While this deference cannot be 
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complete, the abuse of discretion standard is sufficient to ensure that district courts stay 
within permissible bounds in their exercise of this wide-ranging power, while 
simultaneously keeping the authority to make such decision^ in the hands of those who 
witness the actual proceedings, and whose review is not confined to the cold record. 
d. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Ms, Anderson to 
pay Mr. Anderson's attorneys fees incurred in connection with 
preparing for and attending the 20 January 2009 hearing. 
In the present case, the award of attorney's fees incurred in connection with the 20 
January 2009 hearing fell well within the district court's allowable discretion. R. 1250, Tf 
4. The history of non-appearance in this case is also illuminating in helping this court to 
understand why the district court was disposed to grant fee^. The following dates reflect 
hearings where either Ms. Anderson, her counsel, or both failed to attend: 
• May 28, 2008. R. 197. 
• June 11, 2008. R. 408. 
• December 15, 2008. R. 1135. 
• January 6, 2009. R. 1164. 
Also of note is the court's admonition at the July 14^  2008 hearing that Ms. 
Anderson was to attend the September 8, 2008 hearing or ^ warrant would issue for her 
arrest. R. 542. When Ms. Anderson was not prepared to pfoceed at the January 20, 2009 
hearing, it is unsurprising that the court was disposed to gr^nt Mr. Anderson his 
attorney's fees. 
When viewed in context, it is clear that the award of fees was occasioned by Ms. 
Anderson's pattern of non-attendance, which in turn caused Mr. Anderson to incur legal 
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costs he otherwise would not have incurred. For the same reason the grant of fees was 
appropriate in Griffith, it was appropriate here. 
Ms. Anderson has presented neither facts nor argument sufficient to overcome the 
presumption in favor of the trial court's decision in this matter. Ms. Anderson has failed 
to demonstrate a manifest injustice arising out of the order of attorney's fees. Ms. 
Anderson could have avoided this award easily enough. All that was required was that 
she and her attorney appear at the properly noticed hearings prepared to proceed. Her 
repeated failure to attend and the failure of her attorney to come to hearings prepared to 
be heard, as the court ordered, occasioned the waste of the court's time and resources and 
the waste of time and resources of Mr. Anderson. There is no manifest injustice present 
in requiring a party to assume the costs incurred as a result of that party's irresponsible 
conduct. An award of attorney's fees in these circumstances is warranted and falls 
solidly within the parameters of the trial court's broad discretion to govern the affairs 
before it. Ms. Anderson has therefore failed to overcome the presumption in favor of the 
award and failed to meet the exceptionally high burden she faces in the form of the abuse 
of discretion standard of review. 
The trial court's award of attorney's fees should therefore be upheld. 
Furthermore, Mr. Anderson should be awarded attorney's fees incurred on appeal in 
connection with defending against Ms. Anderson's appeal of the award of attorney's fees 
below. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
HELD MS, ANDERSON IN CONTEMPT ON THE COURT 
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION AND ON FACTUAL 
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FINDINGS MADE AND MEMORIALIZED IN QRDERS ENTERED IN 
THIS CASE. 
At the July 14, 2008 hearing, the court found by cleat) and convincing evidence4 
that Ms. Anderson was in contempt of court. R. 542-43; 10^7 f 2. The order formalizing 
the finding of contempt was entered on November 4, 2008. |R. 1094. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that the only sanctionl imposed on Ms. Anderson 
pursuant to the finding of contempt was a finding that Ms. ^nderson comes before the 
court with unclean hands. R. 1043. The court never imposed sanctions pursuant to the 
court's statutory contempt power in the form of a monetary award or imposing jail time. 
Id. The court specifically declined to impose monetary or j^il sanctions, the two 
sanctions available for contempt pursuant to statute, because it was concerned that doing 
so would impair Ms. Anderson's ability to care for the chil4ren. R. 1042-43 at ^ 9. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the order finding Ms. Ajnderson in contempt was 
entered by the district court on the commissioner's recommendation, and not entered 
solely by the commissioner as Ms. Anderson contends. 
Ms. Anderson correctly notes that appellate review 6f a contempt finding involves 
two questions: 1) whether the underlying order was lawfuhl and 2) whether the party's 
conduct constitutes contempt. Utah Farm Production Credit Ass 'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 
1070, 1074 (Utah 1988). 
4
 Mr. Anderson once again points out that Ms. Anderson's lappeal assails findings made 
by the district court without even mentioning the term "marshaling," much less 
attempting to do it. Without discharging her duty to marshal the evidence below and 
show how the facts demonstrate that the district court's findings were clearly erroneous 
even when viewed in the light most favorable to the findings, Ms. Anderson's request 
should be summarily rejected. 
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a. Ms. Anderson was not denied due process. 
Ms. Anderson's arguments that her due process rights5 were violated are not, 
however, well taken. Ms. Anderson relies on Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah Ct. 
App 1991). Boggs is distinguishable from the present case. Boggs relied on the fact that 
the husband was not given notice of contempt proceedings. Id. at 481-82. Rather, the 
hearing wherein a finding of contempt was made was initially noticed as an evidentiary 
hearing on the question of modification and not as an Order to Show Cause. Id. at 481. 
When the husband showed up for an evidentiary hearing, it was converted into a 
contempt hearing without notice to the husband that he would be required to show cause 
as to why he should not be found in contempt and why sanctions should not be imposed. 
Id. Because notice was insufficient, the court held that the contempt proceedings were 
improper. Id. Ms. Anderson also relies on State v. Halverson, 754 P.2d 1228 (Utah 
1988) for the same proposition. The portions of Halverson that Ms. Anderson relies upon 
are identical to the issue in Boggs relevant here, so Mr. Anderson addresses only Boggs. 
Under Boggs, a party in jeopardy of being found in contempt for acts committed 
5
 Mr. Anderson again notes that raising a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal 
is not per se permissible. Case law makes clear that appellate courts reach constitutional 
issues raised for the first time on appeal only where the underlying order constitutes clear 
error or raises exceptional circumstances. Tar on, 2009 UT App at % 7. Because Ms. 
Anderson makes no attempt to argue clear error or exceptional circumstances, 
considering constitutional challenges here is improper because they were not preserved 
below. Nevertheless, because constitutional analysis demonstrates clearly enough that 
Ms. Anderson's position is incorrect, Mr. Anderson addresses this argument on the 
merits. Notwithstanding his addressing the constitutional challenge on its merits, Mr. 
Anderson maintains that considering Ms. Anderson's constitutional challenge for the first 
time on appeal is improper because she did not preserve the issue for appeal below, she 
fails to cite to the record where the issue was preserved for appeal, and because she 
makes no attempt to show plain error, or the existence of exceptional circumstances. 
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outside the presence of the court is entitled to four things: 1)| notice in the form of an 
order to show cause to allow him or her to prepare to addres^ the allegations contained 
therein; 2) an affidavit from the party seeking contempt sandtions stating the basis of the 
allegation of contempt; 3) the assistance of counsel, if requested; and 4) the opportunity 
to be heard. Id. (citing Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982)). 
Notice of the OSC hearing was served on Ms. Ander$on on May 12, 2008. R. 
182. This hearing was continued twice before ultimately being heard two months after 
service of the Order to Show Cause. R. 197; 425-26; 542-41 The Order to Show Cause 
was supported by an affidavit stating the factual basis for th£ allegation of contempt. R. 
165-68. Ms. Anderson was represented by an attorney at th£ hearing where she was 
found in contempt. R. 543. Ms. Anderson was given the opportunity to be heard at the 
July 14, 2008 hearing. Id All procedural safeguards required under Boggs were 
therefore met. After observing all required due process safeguards, Ms. Anderson was 
found in contempt of court. Id. 
Additionally, Ms. Anderson's bald assertion that the district court failed to enter 
findings of fact simply cannot be reconciled with the record R. 1097-98 Iff 1-5. The 
evidence presented at the hearing below was sufficient to support several specific 
findings by clear and convincing evidence in the eyes of both the court commissioner and 
the district court. Id. An assault on these findings, such as ^hat raised by Ms. Anderson 
here, requires far more than a facially false statement that the contempt finding finds no 
support in the evidence. See Andrus, 2007 UT App at f 9. 
b. The underlying order was lawful. 
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That leaves the court with the questions of the lawfulness of the order and whether 
the conduct underlying the finding of contempt indeed constitutes contempt. See Utah 
Farm Production Credit Ass fn 762 P.2d at 1074. In the July 14, 2008 finding of 
contempt, the underlying order that the district court found Ms. Anderson to have 
violated consisted of the directives of the Special Master concerning visitation of the 
children, which were subsequently adopted as the orders of the court. R. 1097. The 
district court enjoys broad discretion in making visitation determinations. Trubetzkoy v. 
Trubetzkoy, 2009 UT App 77, <{ 8, 205 P.3d 891. Notably, Ms. Anderson makes no 
argument that court's order in any way exceeded the bounds of the court's discretion. 
Rather, the crux of her contention on this issue on appeal appears to stem out of an 
alleged denial of due process without specifying exactly how such violation occurred. 
Significantly, then, Ms. Anderson fails to make even a bald contention that the 
underlying order visitation order was unlawful. Because she cannot demonstrate that the 
underlying order amounted to an abuse of discretion, the order was lawful. 
c. The district court's findings demonstrate that Ms. Anderson's actions 
constitute contempt 
To constitute contempt, there must be evidence: 1) the party knew of the duty 
imposed by the underlying order; 2) the party had the ability to comply with the order; 3) 
the party willfully and knowingly refused to comply with the order. Id. 
The record supports the court's finding of contempt. The court found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Ms. Anderson was in contempt. R. 1097, Yf 2-5. This order, 
containing factual findings, appended the special master orders, which were adopted as 
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the court's orders. Id. The court found that Ms. Anderson kjiew about the order to 
forward the money to Mr. Anderson, that she had the ability Ito comply and that she failed 
to comply. R. 1573, f| 8, 9. The findings supported by cle^r and convincing evidence 
that Ms. Anderson failed to comply with the order of the coi^ rt establishes that the 
conduct complained of does, indeed, constitute contempt. Aj/. 
Because the record is replete with evidence that Ms. Anderson's due process rights 
were upheld in every particular, and because the facts underlying the finding of contempt 
amply support the findings and because Ms. Anderson has fjailed to meet her burden to 
marshal the evidence to challenge any of these findings, the| district court's finding of Ms. 
Anderson in contempt was not an abuse of discretion and should be upheld. 
As a tangent, Mr. Anderson notes that part of Ms. Anderson's argument on this 
issue contains the following passage, which can only be described as an improper and 
unprofessional attack on the integrity of Commissioner Thqmas Patton and his regard for 
the due process rights of the litigants who appear before hirh: 
Furthermore, such procedures as occurred in this case have been 
historically practiced by Commissioner Patton in his courtroom, where 
people are immediately taken from his courtroom for incarceration, 
without an evidentiary hearing, without the filing of findings and 
conclusions, and without any of the other procedural safeguards 
established by appellate courts of this state and| 
Supreme Court. 
the United States 
Appellant's Brief at 20. 
First, the only actions of Commissioner Patton that (fan De considered in this 
appeal are the actions found in the record, and not this kin4 of nebulous (and frankly 
dubious) generalized allegations incapable of proof or disproof in any one case, 
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particularly this appeal. Allegations of his practices in his court room that go beyond 
what is contained in the record are not before this court. Raising them in support of an 
argument is improper and they cannot therefore be considered on this appeal. 
More importantly, this type of ad hominem attack upon the integrity of the court 
has no place in an appellate brief. While it may not rise to the level of vitriol that elicited 
the supreme court's now well-known rebuke in the court's addendum to its decision in 
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, If 62, 56 P.3d 524, it is cut out of the 
same cloth and is a departure from the level of civility and decorum that ought to be 
observed by members of the bar. An attack on the integrity of the court simply cannot be 
of any assistance to this court in deciding the issues Ms. Anderson puts before it. 
4. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
ENTERING AN ORDER ON OCTOBER 27,2009 OVER AN OBJECTION 
TO BOTH THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF THE ORDER. 
Ms. Anderson's fourth and final issue raised on appeal is supported solely by 
policy argument. Ms. Anderson states that there is a lack of case law or statutory law6 on 
whether a judge is required to issue a ruling on an objection to form of a proposed order 
before signing and entering it. Mr. Anderson disagrees. Rather, the rules of civil 
procedure and relevant case law disclose that granting of a hearing on non-dispositive 
motions is discretionary. Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, ^ 18, 147 P.3d 963 
(citing Utah R. Civ. Pro. 7(e)) (rev'd on other grounds, Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 
12, 179P.3d775). 
6
 Despite her statement in her brief that this issue is not answered in case law or statutory 
law, Ms. Anderson curiously claims in her statement of the issues that a district court's 
interpretation of case law and statutory law is reviewed for correctness. 
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In Butler, the trial court held a bench trial, following which it issued a written 
memorandum decision. Id. at fflj 3-4. The trial court directed the prevailing party to draft 
an order containing findings of fact consistent with those outlined in the memorandum 
decision. Id. at Tf 4. A proposed order was filed and the defendants filed objections to it. 
Id. at % 18. Over the objections of the defendants and without holding a hearing to 
address the objections, the trial court signed the proposed oiider and it was entered on the 
docket. Id. Defendants appealed, arguing that it was an abi^ se of discretion to enter the 
order over their objection without holding a hearing. Id. Tljiis court disagreed, citing 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 7(e). Id. This court noted that the proposed order was sufficiently 
similar to the memorandum decision on which it was based Ito form a reasonable basis for 
the judge to deny a hearing. Id. at % 19. Importantly, this c0urt noted that when dealing 
with non-dispositive motions, the trial court is not required to hold a hearing prior to 
deciding the issue. Id. (citing Utah R. Civ. Pro. 7(e)). 
In the present case, Ms. Anderson presents a position to this court that it roundly 
rejected in Butler. Here, the court held a hearing wherein it made findings and orders on 
August 18, 2009. R. 1462. Mr. Anderson served a copy of the proposed order as ordered 
by the court. R. 1569. On October 9, 2009, Ms. Anderson Ifiled objections to that 
proposed order. R. 1474-77. Ms. Anderson requested a hearing on her objection. R. 
1477. The trial court subsequently entered the order over Ms. Anderson's objections on 
October 27, 2009 and request for hearing. R. 1570. While |the record is silent regarding 
whether the trial court found that the order was sufficiently (similar to its recollection of 
the findings and orders made at the August 18, 2009 hearing, the clear implication is that 
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the court so found. Particularly where this decision is committed to the discretion of the 
court, there must be a presumption that the court entered the order advisedly, even over 
the objection of Ms. Anderson. 
The only question is therefore whether doing so is an abuse of discretion. As in 
Butler, the trial court here was not required to hold a hearing on the objections raised by 
Ms. Anderson. See Butler, 2006 UT App at % 19; Utah R. Civ. Pro. 7(e)(2010). Entering 
an order over an objection of counsel cannot be an abuse of discretion here for the same 
reason it was not in Butler. In Butler, this court stated that the reason denial of a hearing 
was not an abuse of discretion because the objection simply took issue with the factual 
findings of the court. Id. at f^ 19. Here, Ms. Anderson takes issue with the content of the 
order. R. 1474-77. Curiously, Ms. Anderson's objection contains no citation to which 
portion of the order she felt was improper. Rather, it contains global statements that an 
order should not contain the procedural history that preceded the order. Id. The district 
court apparently disagreed. R. 1570. Mr. Anderson respectfully submits that the district 
court gave Ms. Anderson the ruling on her objection she desired on October 27, 2009. R. 
1570. 
The district court's signing and entering the order over the objection of Ms. 
Anderson therefore not only falls squarely within the court's discretion, it is expressly 
allowed by rule. The district court should therefore be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Anderson's attempts to raise constitutional issues for the first time on appeal 
should not be considered because they were not preserved below and because she has not 
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attempted to, nor can she, show plain error or exceptional circumstances. Likewise, she 
has failed to cite to the record where constitutional issues w^re preserved for appeal. 
Additionally, the thrust of Ms. Anderson's attempt at obtaining a reversal is a thinly-
guised attempt to secure a less rigorous standard of review tjy claiming that questions 
committed to the discretion of the trial court are actually questions of law. She fails, 
however, to identify any relevant source of law upon which this court should rely in its 
correctness review. Her attempt to re-frame the issues notwithstanding, Ms. Anderson 
apparently recognizes her error and states at various points |n her brief that the district 
court abused its discretion. However, when she makes sudN statements, she makes 
nothing more than a few circular statements that the trial court abused its discretion. She 
makes no attempt to specify how the court exceeded the boundaries of its allowable 
discretion on any particular instance. Considering the deference afforded trial courts on 
discretionary matters, such anemic argument cannot suffice to establish an abuse of 
discretion. 
Additionally, in several instances, identified herein, Ms. Anderson's appeal 
necessarily entails a challenge to factual findings made by t)he district court on the court 
commissioner's recommendation. Ms. Anderson makes no attempt to marshal the 
evidence as she is required to do in order to make a challenge to factual findings below. 
Because Ms. Anderson has failed to carry her burdeu on appeal to make these 
weighty challenges to the trial court's findings, her appeal tfnust fail. Likewise, because 
the record discloses that the trial court stayed within the boundaries of its allowable 
discretion in handling this complex and contentious case, Ms. Anderson's appeal must 
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fail. The trial court should therefore be upheld in ever particular. 
Mr. Anderson should also be awarded his reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
connection with defending the attorney's fee award made below on this appeal. 
DATED AND SIGNED on this, the J3 day of May, 2010 
Datf^r 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Kelly Anderson 
D.Youhgj Brent 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Kelly Anderson 
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I do hereby certify that on the Z P day of May, 2010,1 did cause to be mailed, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELIJEE, via U.S. regular mail, 
postage prepaid to the following, addressed as follows: 
GREGORY B. WALL, #3365 
NATHAN B. WALL, #11431 
WALL & WALL 
2168 E. Fort Union Blvd 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
KELLY M. PETERSEN, #9173 
Guardian Ad Litem 
32 W. Center Street, Suite 205 
Provo, UT 84601 
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KELLY M. PETERSON (9173) 
Office of the Guardian ad Litem, Fourth District 
32 West Center Street, Suite 205 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: (801)344-8516 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KELLY LLOYD ANDERSON, 
Respondent 
EX PARTE TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER 
Case No: 074402410 
Judge: 
Commissioner: Thomas Patton 
TO THE ABO VE-NAMED PARTIES: DEBORAH ANDERSQN AND KELLY LLOYD 
ANDERSON 
As part of its Temporary Restraining Order, which hereby enters, the Court orders that: 
(1) temporary care, custody, and control of the parties' minor adaptive children (Annette, 
Thelma, Emilie, Elizabeth, Israel, Shaila, Ira, Annaneya, and Isa^c) is immediately awarded to 
Father; (2) temporary care, custody and control of the minor children Ian and Isaiah, who are 
currently in the process of being adopted by Mother, is immediately awarded to Father, (3) 
Medical Power of Attorney for all of the above-referenced minof children is given to the Office 
of the Special Master, who be all of the children's medical attorhey-in-fact; (4) the Special 
Master, Sandra Dredge, is authorized to sign any Releases of Information necessary to obtain 
medical or therapeutic information or records regarding the aboVe-referenced children, and to 
speaking with any medical or therapeutic treatment providers regarding said children; (5) a Pick 
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Up Order will enter herewith to authorize and order any peace officer or other law enforcement 
to take the above-referenced children into custody and to convey said children to Father; (6) 
Mother's contact with the children will be supervised by a professional supervisor at her own 
expense; and (7) all that funds Mother is currently receiving for the children's support (e g., the 
support Mother receives from the States of Nevada and California) will be directed to Father, and 
will be used for the children's support, and only for the children's support. 
This order is being signed on an ex parte basis because it appears that permanent and . -c 
irreparable harm may come to the minor children if the order is not signed THIS EX PARTE 
restraining order expires on the 1$ day of Udio^d 2008, at the hour of 1^00a.m./i^m), 
at which time this matter is set for further hearing before Court Commissioner Thomas Patton, 
room 303 of the Fourth District Court, located at 125 North 100 West, in Provo, UT. 
Signed and dated this / T day of Q 6 ^ 2008, at the hour of (%0_ p.m . 
»f \'A ftp* 
DISTRICT COURT JUOGE 
Page 2 of 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of Ocjlte*- . 2|008,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to each of the following: 
Gregory B. Wall 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2168 East Ft. Union Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Brent D. Young tfreniJL>. loung j / .
 ( . -
Attorney for Respondent —" ( f t 4 ^ /) CU^/Cti-
226 W. 2230 N. 
PO Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
Sandra Dredge Sandra Dredge / / h ( ,^> 
Special Master ( T T ^ ¥^U^fC^ 
226 W. 2230 N., Ste. 100 
Provo, UT 84604 
Page 3 of 3 
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JUL 2 12003 
4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Respondent 
226 W. 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTl OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KELLY L. ANDERSON, 
Respondent. 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER 
THAT EXP ARTE RESTRAINING 
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION IS PERMANENT 
(HEARING DATE (OCTOBER 27, 
2008) 
Civil No. 074402410 
The above-entitled matter came on before the court on the 27th day of October 2008. 
Brent Young appeared for Petitioner, Kelly Anderson, who was Ipresent. Nathan Wall appeared 
for Deborah Anderson was present, Kelly Peterson appeared as Ouardian ad Litem. The Special 
Master's office appeared. 
The matter was before the court pursuant to the Guardian ad Litem's "Ex Parte Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order and Ex Parte Motion for Pick-|up Order and Writ of 
Assistance," and the "Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order" and "Order for Writ of Assistance 
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and to Pick Up Minor Children" which were reviewed and signed by the District Court on 
Friday, 17 October, 2008 at 1900. 
Brent Knorr M.D. appeared pursuant to subpoena . Dustin B. Wise M.D. appeared 
pursuant to subpoena. Amy Poisson, LPN appeared pursuant to subpoena. Robert Shade, 
Nursing Coordinator for Home Care Givers, appeared pursuant to subpoena. Terri Holland, 
Supervising nurse at Home Care Givers appeared pursuant to subpoena. 
A letter written by Dr. Knorr dated 17 October 2008 was filed by counsel for Mrs. 
Anderson. The letter, by its terms, appears to have been written on or about the 2nd day of 
October 2008. It bears the date of 17 October, 2008. That letter was submitted to the court 
pursuant to a "Notice of Lodging11 on or about the 24th day of October 2008. A letter written by 
Dr. Knorr dated October 21, 2008, apparently written on or about that day, was filed by counsel 
for Mr. Anderson pursuant to a "Notice of Lodging" on the 24 day of October 2008. 
The court, in issuing the Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, relied upon the 
following documents: 
1. Affidavit of the Special Master dated 17 October 2008; 
2. Letter from Lone Peak Pediatrics dated 16 October, 2008 signed by Melanie 
Murphy, PA-C and Dustin B. Wise, M.D.; 
3. Letter written by Dustin B. Wise M.D. dated July 9, 2008; 
4. Letter dated September 30,2008 written by the Special Master to Kelly Peterson; 
5. Letter to Terri Holland dated October 16-17,2008, written by Amy Poisson, LPN, 
with accompanying photographs; 
2 001412 
6. Letter dated October 10, 2008 from Terri Holland to Melissa, the Special Master's 
assistant; 
7. Letter from Robert Shade dated Friday, October ^0, 2008; and 
8. Letter "To Whom it May Concern" from Stephanie Hansen, dated October 17, 
2008. 
After Friday 17 October 2008, other documents were submitted. Those documents 
describe, in more graphic detail, the claims made in the documents served upon Mrs. Anderson 
on Friday, 17 October, 2008. There is more than enough evidence in the documents served upon 
Mrs. Anderson to support granting a permanent injunction. When the court considers the 
documents with which Mrs. Anderson was served, which accompanied the Ex Parte Restraining 
Order, and specifically the "Order for Writ of Assistance and to Kck Up Minor Children"," the 
Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order" and the "Ex Parte Restraining Order," and 
when the court considers the two letters provided by Dr. Knorr, 0ne provided by Mr. Young, and 
one provided by Mr. Wall, on Friday, 24 October, 2008, the couift concludes that the evidence 
provided is clear and convincing that the Temporary Restraining| Order or preliminary injunction 
should be made permanent. 
The court afforded counsel for Mrs. Anderson the opportunity to address her oral motion 
for continuance. (1:09, 3:34, 8:17) The court was concerned about the circumstance with 
respect to the children. If the case is continued the doctors and nurses will not be required to 
reappear (8:56) but would have to be available by phone and may state their position in writing. 
(9:52)(15:13) 
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The court inquired how Mr. Anderson would be prejudiced by a continuance. (11:22) 
Mr. Young responded that Mr. Anderson would not be prejudiced if the court made additional 
orders. His requests were: 
a. That the children receive their personal property, and all property 
necessary to maintain them; 
b. That the support for the children received from California by wire to Mrs. 
Anderson on Friday the 24th of October or Monday the 27th of October in the 
approximate amount of $7,000, be delivered forthwith to Mr. Anderson; 
c. That all future payments from California and Nevada are be delivered to 
Mr. Anderson; 
d. That Mr. Anderson be delivered the children's Medicaid cards; 
e. That Mr. Anderson be delivered a list and schedule of the children's 
prescriptions. 
Mr. Kelly Peterson requested, in addition to the requests made by Mr. Young, that Mrs. 
Anderson sign the medical releases as previously ordered by the court. 
The court took a recess for Mr. Wall to discuss these specific concerns and the request for 
continuance with Mrs. Anderson. After the recess, Mr. Wall responded to these requests by 
claiming that the court did not find that Mrs. Anderson had been found to have unclean hands 
(which the court specifically did) and by claiming that Mr. Anderson was behind in child 
support. In addressing the $7,000, Mr. Wall stated the payment to be paid for November 2008 
should be paid, in large part, to Mrs. Anderson. He further claimed that Mrs. Anderson had 
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signed all of the releases. The Guardian ad Litem stated this wa^ not correct. 
At this point in the hearing the court denied the request f0r continuance, and asked Mr. 
Wall what he wanted the court to know. Mr. Wall's response w$s that he had not had time to 
review the new documents, and had only had other documents fc}r a week. (17:10). 
The court now being fully advised makes and enters the following: 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER 
1. The Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order or preliminary injunction is made 
permanent. There is a great deal of evidence submitted in support of the TRO. (17:28) The 
Commissioner is charged with the responsibility to decide what is best for the children. (17:43) 
There is more than enough evidence before the court to conclude that in fact, the TRO should be 
made permanent. (18:10) There is also evidence which support^ the claim for a continuance, 
(18:08) but ultimately someone must advocate for the children. Standing up and telling the court 
that the father is not here with clean hands (18:45) when it is the| Guardian ad Litem who has 
brought this motion, as well as Mrs. Anderson's failure to comply with prior orders as indicated 
by the Guardian ad Litem leads the court to conclude that the argument made does not address 
what is best for the children. Rather, these arguments concern Mrs. Anderson. 
2. It ought to be easy for a party who has the best interest of the children as a priority 
to address the needs of the children. (19:31) Of course Medicaid cards for the children should 
be delivered. Of course, personal property should be delivered. 0f course, money is needed by 
the father now for the children. However, these were not the arguments or the positions 
presented to the court by Mrs. Anderson. 
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3. The court heard the argument which was all about Mrs. Anderson . (19:45) The 
court concluded that it should not place the children back with the mother when she could not 
even agree on a temporary basis, or even address on a temporary basis, what was in the best 
interest of the children for the next four weeks. (19:57) 
4. Mr. Anderson's other requests are granted. Specifically, it was not disputed that 
Mrs. Anderson received $7,000 on Friday, October 24th, or Monday, October 27th, or previously 
in mid-October. That money ($7,000) is to be forthwith delivered, via Brent D. Young's office, 
to Mr. Kelly Anderson. That money is needed by the father now. Healthcare needs of the 
children need to be addressed now. The court is not inclined to have money, which has as its 
primary purpose the needs of the children, remain with Mrs. Anderson. In Utah the law is that 
support follows the children. 
3. Mr. Anderson is granted custody of the children. 
4. All economic support from whatever governmental agency, whether state or 
federal, provides support for the children is awarded to Mr. Anderson, and is to be delivered 
directly to Mr. Anderson until further order of the court. 
5. The Special Master will make arrangements for visitation with Mrs. Anderson. 
6. Mr. Peterson is to notify the other states of what is occurring in Utah with respsect 
to these children. 
ILING CERTIFICATE 
c^MMissioi^Tfa^^i^dhj 
I hereby certify that on the 30th of October, 2008 AND on the 24th day of 
February, 2009 I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER THAT EXPARTE RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS PERMANENT (HEARING D W (OCTOBER 27, 2008), to 
the following, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Gregory B. Wall 
Nathan Wall 
Attorney at Law 
2168 E. Fort Union Boulevard 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Sandra Dredge 
Attorney at Law 
226 W. 2230 North 
Provo, UT 84604 
(hand delivered) 
Kelly Peterson 
Attorney at Law 
32 W. Center #205 
Provo, UT 84601 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
H \COMMON\Brent\Dictation\Anderson Kelly recommendation in order for permanent injunction rtf 
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l-oLif.n .. - :-J District Court 
of ytah County, Sia.s o>' L>'r'r' 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IV1E & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Respondent 
226 W. 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
Fax: (801)375-3067 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
KELLY ANDERSON, 
Respondent 
L _ ^ 1 - • - • - = 
ORDER STRIKING PLEADINGS AND 
ENTRY OF DEFAULT 
Civil No. 074402410 
1 
The above-entitled matter came on before the court on December 15, 2008 at 2:00 p.m. as 
previously scheduled and noticed. The following individuals w£re present: Sandra Dredge as 
special master; Melissa Guercio, as assistant to the Special Master; Kelly Peterson as guardian ad 
litem for the children; and Brent Young, representing Kelly Anderson, who was also present. 
The court waited until 2:25 p.m. This was the second tm|e Mrs. Anderson has failed to 
appear for scheduled hearings. The court notes that notice of this hearing was mailed to counsel 
on 5 December 2008. The stated purpose on the motion was for) oral arguments an order to show 
cause and a scheduling conference. The notice specified that failure to appear could result in 
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pleadings been stricken or a judgment against either party if they failed to appear. It was not the 
first time Mrs. Anderson's attorney, Mr. Wall, has been substantially late. Mr. Wall, in any 
event, did not appear. After 2:25 p.m. on Monday, December 15, 2008, after not receiving any 
contact from Mr. Wall, the court now makes and enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. The Guardian ad Litem's motion to strike Mrs. Anderson's pleadings and to enter 
her default is granted. Mrs. Anderson's pleadings are therefore stricken, and her default is taken. 
2. The relief requested in Respondent's Counterclaim is granted. 
3. Mr. Anderson is awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the parties' 
minor children to wit: 
ANDERSON, Annette 
ANDERSON, Thelma Marie 
ANDERSON, Emilie 
ANDERSON, Lazay Elizabeth 
ANDERSON, Israel 
ANDERSON, Shaila 
ANDERSON, Ira 
ANDERSON, Isaac 
ANDERSON, Annaneya 
4. Mrs. Anderson's visitation is indefinitely suspended pending further application 
by Mrs. Anderson and further hearing of the court. 
5. The children will be in therapy until their therapists release them from therapy. 
The parties will follow the treatment as per the instructions of their therapists. 
6. The Special Master orders are to remain in place. 
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7. The children will not be subject to corporal punishment. 
8. Mr, Anderson's order to show cause is continued to the 20th day of January 
2009 at 1( rOO a.ui. At that time, the court will entertain Mr, ^derson's order to show cause 
which was served upon Mr. Wall on December % 2008, sectary to hold Mrs. Anderson m 
contempt. It appeared to the court that Mr. Gregory Wall had been served with the Order to 
Show Cause re Contempt on 9 December, 2008 on behalf of hik client. 
9. The court has attached to this Order a copy of fob notice of the hearing of 
December 15,2008, which was maried to the Guardian ad Litem, counsel for Mrs Anderson, 
and counst 1 for Mr, Anderson on December 5,2008. 
KELLY PLTBRSON 
Guardian a i Litem 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on t h e / ^ d a y of QjU_ , 2008 I caused to be mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER STRIKING PLEADINGS AND ENTRY 
OF DEFAULT, to the following, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Nathan Wall 
Gregory Wall 
Attorney at Law 
2168 E. Fort Union Boulevard 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Kelly Peterson 
Attorney at Law 
32 W. Center #205 
Provo, UT 84601 
Sandra Dredge 
Attorney at Law 
226 W. 2230 North 
Provo, UT 84604 
(hand delivered) 
BRENT D-YOUNGf 
H \COMMON\Breni\Dictation\Anderson Kelly order striking pleadings and entry of default rtf 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KELLY L ANDERSON, 
Respondent 
NOTICE Of 
ORAL ARG/OSC/SCHED CONF 
Case No: 074402410 DA 
Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
Date: December 5,20OB 
ORAL ARG/OSC/SCHED CONF. 
Date; 12/15/2008 
Time: 01:59 p.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 3 03 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84G01 
Before Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
The reason for the change is On the Court's <£>wn motion 
Failure to appear at Pretrial or Scheduling Conference may result 
in the Court striking your pleadings and entering judgment by 
default. 
This matter was originally set for Oral Arguments and an Order to 
Show Cause. This hearing will now include a Scheduling Conference. 
Faxlure to appear at Pretrial or Scheduling Conference may result 
in the Court striking your pleadings and ^WJft^fffi judgment by 
default. 
Dated this day of DEC 0 5 m 
_ ^ f i 
Di^ta^*^ Cbu^s^D^puty Clerk 
Page 1 00123t 
Case No: 074402410 
Date: Dec 05, 2008 
The Court will provide interpreters for criminal cases and domestic 
violence cases involving protective orders or stalking injunctions. 
(Fees in criminal cases may be imposed at the judge's discretion.) 
IF YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASE PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT at (801)429-1006 (five days before the 
hearing, if possible). 
FOR ALL OTHER CASES, you must bring someone with you to 
interpret. If you do not know soitieone who can help you, the names 
of court interpreters you can hire are listed on the courts' 
website athttp://www.utcourts.gov/resources/interp/certified,html. 
If you do not have access to the internet, ask the court clerk to 
print off a copy of this list for you. 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) should call TERI at (801)429-1112 at least three 
working days prior to the proceeding. (For TTY service call Utah 
Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711) 
Page 2 v. 001230 
Case No: 074402410 
Date: Dec 05, 2008 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
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4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
I VIE &• YOUNG 
Attorneys for Respondent 
226 W. 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT] OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KELLY L. ANDERSON, 
Respondent. 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER 
(HEARING DATE FEBRUARY 23, 
2009) 
Civil No. 1074402410 
Commissioner Tom Patton 
The above-entitled matter came on before the court on February 23,2009. Petitioner, 
Deborah Anderson, was present and represented by Nathan WallJ Respondent, Kelly Anderson, 
was present represented by Brent Young. Kelly Peterson appeared as Guardian ad Litem. 
Sandra Dredge appeared as Special Master. 
The matter was before the court pursuant to claims of botfy parties. Mr. Anderson 
brought the following complaint pursuant to an order to show ca^se for contempt. 
1. Failure to comply with the "Recommendation and |Order (Hearing Date 
September 8, 2008)", paragraph 5, requiring her to "undertake all [necessary steps such that she 
will have her amended return completed and filed [sic] no later than October 10, 2008." 
2, Failure to deliver $7,000 to Kelly Anderson as ordered by the court at the 27 
October 2008 hearing. Failure to deliver personal property as ordered by the court 
3. Failure to deliver personal property of the children and other items to Kelly 
Anderson as ordered by the court on 27 October 2008. 
Mrs. Anderson had scheduled her motion to set aside her default to be heard on 23 
February 2009. 
The court after having reviewed the file and having entertain arguments of counsel makes 
and enters the following: 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER 
1. Mrs. Anderson's motion to set aside the default will not be considered by the court 
until she comes into foil compliance with prior orders of the court. The specific orders and the 
requirements of these orders are set forth below. 
A. The "Recommendation and Order (Hearing Date September 8, 2008)" 
provides at paragraph 5. 
Mrs. Anderson is ordered to cooperate fully in amending her individual tax filing for 
the year 2007 to accomplish filing a joint tax return with Mr. Kelly Anderson. (37:42) 
She is ordered to undertake ail necessary steps such that she will have her amended return 
completed and failed [sic] no later than 10 October 2008. If for any reason,(37:50) Mr. 
Anderson would recover any of the money due to a refund, that money is to be delivered 
to Mr. Young, held in his trust account, and notice given to Mr. Wall (37:58) and to the 
Office of Recovery Services. 
B. The "Recommendation and Order that Exparte Restraining Order and 
2
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Preliminary Injunction is Permanent (Hearing Date October 27, ^008)", which was unsigned as 
of the date of this hearing, February 23, 2009, provides at page 6 paragraph 4: 
Mr. Anderson's other requests are granted. Specifically, it was not disputed that 
Mrs. Anderson received $7,000 on Friday, October 24th, 
previously in mid-October. That money ($7,000) is to be forthwith delivered, via Brent 
D. Young's office, to Mr. Kelly Anderson. That money is 
Healthcare needs of the children need to be addressed now. The court is not inclined to 
have money, which has as its primary purpose the needs o 
or Monday, October 27th, or 
needed by the father now. 
the children, remain with Mrs. 
Anderson. In Utah the law is that support follows the children. 
C. The Exparte Temporary Restraining Ordei[ dated 17 October 2008 also 
provided: 
(7) all that [sic] funds Mother is currently receiving for the children's support (e.g., 
the support Mother receives from the States of Nevada and California) will be directed to 
Father, and will be used for the children's support, and oqy for the children's support. 
D. Paragraph 8a of the "Recommendation an^ l Order that Exparte Restraining 
Order and Preliminary Injunction is Permanent (Hearing f)ate October 27, 2008)" 
unsigned as of 23 February, 2009, provides: 
That the children receive their personal property, ^nd all property necessary to 
maintain them. 
E. Paragraph 2, page 5 of the "Recommendation and Order that Exparte 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is Permanent (Heading Date October 27, 2008)" 
unsigned as of February 23 2009, provides: 
... Of course, personal property should be delivered ... 
2. At such time as Mrs. Deborah Anderson comes infco full compliance with the 
3 001416 
orders cited above, which must be within a reasonable time, and if Mr. Wall chooses to file the 
appropriate documents with his motion to set aside the default pursuant to Rule 7 or the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, then and only then will the court consider Mrs. Anderson's motion to 
set aside the default, which default was entered on the 6th day of February, 2009. 
3, The sanctions reserved in paragraph 9 of the "Recommendation and Order 
(Hearing date September 8, 2008)" are at this point merged into the order which entered Mrs. 
Anderson's default. The sanctions reserved by that order will only be considered if the court sets 
aside the entry of her default. That paragraph of the order from the 8 September, 2008 hearing 
provides as follows, citations omitted: 
The court has previously found Mrs. Anderson in contempt in July 2008. At the 
hearing on September 8, 2008 the court was troubled regarding what sanctions were to be 
imposed. The court is looking for meaningful sanctions. At this time the court declines to 
impose sanctions which would limit Mrs. Anderson's ability to care for the children. 
However, the court rules that the sanction it does impose at this time is that the court 
specifically finds that Mrs. Anderson does not come to court with clean hands. She has not 
complied with the orders of the court. She has not provided the information regarding to 
[sic] the children to the Special Master. The court does not make this finding lightly and 
would not make this finding, it [sic] it were not seriously concerned about her continued 
conduct in not obeying the orders of the court.... 
Dated thiso(| day of _ . 2009. 
4 001415 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 2^_ day of February, 20091 caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RECOMMENDATION AND |)RDER (HEARING DATE 
FEBRUARY 23, 2009) to the following, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Gregory B. Wall 
Nathan Wall 
Attorney at Law 
2168 E. Fort Union Boulevard 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Sandra Dredge 
Attorney at Law 
226 W. 2230 North 
Provo, UT 84604 
(hand delivered] 
Kelly Peterson 
Attorney at Law 
32 W. Center #205 
Provo, UT 84601 
BRENT D. YO 
H \COMMON\Brent\Dictation\Anderson Kelly recommendation for order hearing February 23,2009 rtf 
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4THDIST 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorney for Respondent 
226 W. 2230 North, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0F UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
KELLY L. ANDERSON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER (HEARING DATE JANUARY 20, 
2009) 
Civil No. 074402410 
Commissioner 
Judge: 
Tom Patton 
The above-entitled matter came on before the court pursulant to the order of the court held 
on the 15th day of December 15,2008, at which time counsel for|Mrs. Anderson failed to appear. 
On 15 December 2008 the court continued those matters noticed |for 15 December 2008 pursuant 
that notice mailed to counsel on December 5, 2008. 
At the hearing on January 20, 2009 Deborah Anderson was present and represented by 
Nathan Wall. Kelly Anderson was present and represented by Bfent Young. Kelly Peterson 
appeared as Guardian ad Litem. Sandra Dredge appeared as Special Master. After hearing 
argument of counsel the court now makes and enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. This case is continued to Monday, Febraary 23, 2009 at 3:00 p.m. 
2. Mr. Wall is given 10 days to supplement, pursuant to Rule 101 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, his motion to strike the order to show cause. Mr. Young may have 10 days to 
respond. 
3. The following issues will be heard on Monday February 23 at 3:00 p.m. 
a. Mr. Anderson's order to show cause, seeking to hold Ms. Anderson in 
contempt; 
b. The objection to the proposed order of the court drafted by Mr. Young 
from the hearing of 27 October, 2008. 
c. It is the courts intent at the hearing on 23 February 2009 to first hear the 
motion filed by Mrs. Anderson to strike the order to show cause. 
d. After the court has resolved the motion to strike the order to show cause, 
depending upon the court's ruling, it will or will not entertain the question of contempt. 
e. Finally, the court will hear Ms. Anderson's motion to set aside the default, 
which was entered pursuant to the hearing of 15 December 2008. 
f. The court will hear other issues which may be appropriately and timely 
noticed for the hearing on Monday, February 23, 2009 at 3:00 p.m. 
4. Kelly Anderson is awarded attorneys fees as against Deborah Anderson for his 
counsel's preparation for and attendance at the hearing of 20 January 2009. 
5. The Guardian ad Litem is awarded attorneys fees for preparation and attendance 
at the hearing 20 January 2009. 
2 001250 
6. Sandra Dredge, the Special Master, is awarded attorneys fees for preparation and 
attendance at the hearing of January 20,2009. 
7. The basis for these awards for attorneys fees islthe failure of Mrs. Anderson's 
counsel to provide a memorandura or an affidavit in support of her motion, to strike. 
Dated this ^ 3 day of ^ b r a o o a x 2009, 
BY THE C£ 
JA v i DISTRW* courcr JUBGB- ^y*ji$ 
CfOMMISSlOpEJl TQM PAtfOH $ Af^t^VJ*' 
T 
\ of 
XJP&JC0 MAILING CERTIFICATE (A-U 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 20091 caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER (HEARING DATE JANUARY 20,2009), to the 
following, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Nathan Wall 
Gregory Wall 
Attorney at Law 
2168 E. Fort Union Boulevard 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Kelly Peterson 
Attorney at Law 
32 W. Center #205 
Provo.UT 84601 
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6. Sandra Dredge, the Special Master, is awarded attorneys fees for preparation and 
attendance at the hearing of January 20, 2009. 
7. The basis for these awards for attorneys fees is the failure of Mrs. Anderson's 
counsel to provide a memorandum or an affidavit in support of her motion to strike. 
Dated this day of , 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
COMMISSIONER TOM PATTON 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the <^Qday oJHfaOTiHry, 2009 I caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER (HEARING DATE JANUARY 20, 2009), to the 
following, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Nathan Wall 
Gregory Wall 
Attorney at Law 
2168 E. Fort Union Boulevard 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Kelly Peterson 
Attorney at Law 
32 W. Center #205 
Provo,UT 84601 
^ W ^ l 
2?%hQh 
Sandra Dredge 
Attorney at Law 
226 W. 2230 North 
Provo, UT 84604 
(hand delivered) 
H \COMMON\Brent\Dictation\Anderson Kelly ord 1-20-09 doc 
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Fourth ''sdicial District u . , 
of Utah ^omty, Siate
 0f Utnr 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
Attorneys for Respondent 
226 W. 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
Fax: (801)375-3067 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Of UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
KELLY ANDERSON, 
Respondent. 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = s = = = = = = = ^ 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT (HEARING 
DATE AUGUST 18, 2009) 
Civil No. 074402410 
Judge: Darold JJ McDade 
The above-entitled matter came on before the court on 18 August, 2009. It was initially 
scheduled on June 6, 2009. Mr. Nathan Wall was then ordered to prepare an order outlining the 
issues to be presented. The matter was scheduled for August 10, ^009. Mrs. Anderson moved 
for a continuance, which was granted. This matter went forward qn 18 August, 2009. Mr. 
Nathan Wall did not prepare the order as directed. 
The following individuals were present: Sandra Dredge as special master; Melissa 
Guercio, as assistant to the Special Master; Nathan Wall representing Deborah Anderson, who 
was present, Brent D. Young representing Kelly Anderson, who \^as present, and Kelly Peterson 
as guardian ad litem for the children. 
To facilitate the reader's understanding of the court's ruling, the following documents are 
attached: 
a. Order (Hearing Date January 20, 2009); See Exhibit A attached. 
b. Recommendation and Order (Hearing Date February 23, 2009); See 
Exhibit B attached. 
c. Order from Striking Pleadings and Entering Default, Hearing Date 15 
December, 2008, dated 6 February, 2009. See attached Exhibit C. 
Mr. Wall was to have prepared an order outlining the issues to be addressed at the 18 
August 2009 hearing. He did not. There were two issues to be considered: (1) Mrs. Anderson's 
objection to the Order (Hearing Date January 20, 2009). See attached Exhibit D. This Order 
awarded attorney's fees against Mrs. Anderson, and identified the issues to be heard at the 
hearing of 23 February, 2009; and (2) Mrs. Anderson's Objection to the Recommendation and 
Order (Hearing Date February 23, 2009). See attached Exhibit E. This Recommendation 
refused to consider setting aside the default until Mrs. Anderson came into full compliance with 
prior orders of the court. 
The court now makes and enters the following 
ORDER 
1. (Counter #17:45, 23:48) The court declines to reverse the Commissioner's 
recommendation regarding the attorney fees which were awarded pursuant to page 2 paragraph 4 
of the order from the hearing of 20 January, 2009. 
2. The court is of the view that the award of attorney fees to Mr. Kelly Peterson, 
Guardian ad Litem, and Mr. Young, attorney for Kelly Anderson y/ere awarded because of Mrs. 
Anderson's failure to appear, and counsel's failure to appear on 1 5 December, 2009. Regarding 
the concern expressed by Mr. Nathan Wall regarding proper noticp for the hearing on 15 
December, 2008, the court observes that notice of the December 1|5, 2008 was sent on the 
following days: 
a. October 24, 2008 Oral Argumeht scheduled and mailed 
by the court for hearing of 15 December 
2008 (&e Exhibit F) (See also 
Disc # 2 10:2k and Docket, page 16) 
b. December 5, 2008 Oral argumeitt/Order to Show Cause 
Scheduling Conference set 15 
December 2008 See Exhibit G) (See also 
Docket pages) 19,20) 
c. Service 12/9/08 Mr. Gregory [Wall served on 9 December 
2008 for the hearing/OTSC on 15 December 
2008, return M service) (See Exhibit H) 
(See Disc #2 [32:35, and Docket page 21) 
3. The Commissioner conducted a hearing on 15 December 2008. Pursuant to that 
hearing the court entered an order on 6 February 2009 striking Mips. Anderson's pleadings and 
entering her default. 
4. (Counter #25:15) Mrs. Anderson's objection to the Order (Hearing Date January 
20, 2009), signed 23 February 2009 by Judge McDade, is also defied. 
5. (Counter # 26:25) Regarding Mrs. Anderson's mdtion to have her default set 
aside, the Commissioner had previously ruled that the motion to set aside the default would not 
be considered until Mrs. Anderson had come into full compliance, and until Mr. Nathan Wall, if 
he chooses, files the appropriate documents to set aside the default. See Recommendation and 
Order (Hearing Date February 23, 2009). The Order from the hearing on 23 February 2009, 
which was signed on 21 July 2009, is set forth hereafter in its entirety for the court's ready 
reference. 
The above-entitled matter came on before the court on February 23, 2009. 
Petitioner, Deborah Anderson, was present and represented by Nathan Wall. 
Respondent, Kelly Anderson, was present represented by Brent Young. Kelly Peterson 
appeared as Guardian ad Litem. Sandra Dredge appeared as Special Master. 
The matter was before the court February 23, 2009 pursuant to claims of both parties. 
Mr. Anderson brought the following complaint pursuant to an order to show cause 
for contempt. 
1. Failure to comply with the "Recommendation and Order (Hearing 
Date September 8, 2008)", paragraph 5, requiring her to "undertake all necessary 
steps such that she will have her amended return completed and filed [sic] no later 
than October 10, 2008." 
2. Failure to deliver $7,000 to Kelly Anderson as ordered by the court 
at the 27 October 2008 hearing. Failure to deliver personal property as ordered by 
the court. 
3. Failure to deliver personal property of the children and other items 
4 
to Kelly Anderson as ordered by the court on 27 October 2008. 
Mrs. Anderson had scheduled her motion to set asicjle her default to be heard on 23 
February 2009. 
The court after having reviewed the file and having entertain arguments of 
counsel makes and enters the following: Counter # 12:52 
RECOMMENDATION AND OIpER 
1. Mrs. Anderson's motion to set aside the default will not be considered 
(13:20, 19:22, 30:06) by the court until she comes into full compliance with prior orders 
of the court subject to appropriately filed objections which may be heard by the district 
court. (31:00) The specific orders and the requirements of these orders are set forth 
below. 
A. The "Recommendation and Order (Rearing Date September 8, 
2008)" provides at paragraph 5. 
Mrs. Anderson is ordered to cooperate fully in amending her individual tax 
filing for the year 2007 to accomplish filing a joint tax return with Mr. Kelly 
Anderson. (37:42) She is ordered to undertake all necessary steps such that she 
will have her amended return completed and failed [sic] no later than 10 October 
2008. If for any reason,(37:50) Mr. Anderson would recover any of the money 
due to a refund, that money is to be delivered to Mr. Young, held in his trust 
account, and notice given to Mr. Wall (37:58) and 
Services. 
to the Office of Recovery 
B. The "Recommendation and Order that Exparte Restraining Order 
and Preliminary Injunction is Permanent (Hearing pate October 27, 2008)", 
which was unsigned as of the date of this hearing, February 23, 2009, provides at 
page 6 paragraph 4: 
Mr. Anderson!s other requests are granted. Specifically, it was not disputed 
that Mrs. Anderson received $7,000 on Friday, October 24th, or Monday, 
October 27th, or previously in mid-October. That money ($7,000) is to be 
forthwith delivered, via Brent D. Young's office, to Mr. Kelly Anderson. That 
money is needed by the father now. Healthcare needs of the children need to be 
addressed now. The court is not inclined to have money, which has as its primary 
purpose the needs of the children, remain with Mrs. Anderson. In Utah the law is 
that support follows the children. (Subject referenced at hearing of 23 February 
2009 at counter # 13:15, 29:27, 38:09, 44:50, 45:59) 
C. The Exparte Temporary Restraining Order dated 17 October 2008 
also provided: 
(7) all that [sic] funds Mother is currently receiving for the 
children's support (e.g., the support Mother receives from the States of 
Nevada and California) will be directed to Father, and will be used for the 
children's support, and only for the children's support. 
D. Paragraph 8a of the "Recommendation and Order that Exparte 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is Permanent (Hearing Date 
October 27, 2008)" unsigned as of 23 February, 2009, provides: 
That the children receive their personal property, and all property necessary 
to maintain them. 
E. Paragraph 2, page 5 of the "Recommendation and Order that 
Exparte Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is Permanent (Hearing Date 
October 27, 2008)" unsigned as of February 23 2009, provides: 
... Of course, personal property should be delivered. ... 
2. At such time as Mrs. Deborah Anderson comes into full compliance 
(29:37) with the orders cited above, which must be within k reasonable time, (13:15 
Regarding the $7,000; 28:09 Regarding the $7,000; 44:50 Regarding the $7,000; 45:59 
Regarding the $7,000) and if Mr. Wall chooses to file the appropriate documents (28:45) 
with his motion to set aside the default pursuant to Rule 7 tf>r the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, then and only then will the court consider Mrs. Anderson's motion to set aside 
the default, which default was entered on the 6th day of February, 2009. 
3. The sanctions reserved in paragraph 9 of th^ "Recommendation and Order 
(Hearing date September 8, 2008)" are at this point mergect (42:33) into the order which 
entered Mrs. Anderson's default. The sanctions reserved b^ that order will only be 
considered if the court sets aside the entry of her default. (42:39) That paragraph of the 
order from the 8 September, 2008 hearing provides as follows, citations omitted: 
The court has previously found Mrs. Anderson in contempt in July 2008. 
At the hearing on September 8, 2008 the court was troubled regarding what 
sanctions were to be imposed. The court is looking for meaningful sanctions. At 
this time the court declines to impose sanctions which would limit Mrs. Anderson's 
ability to care for the children. However, the court rules that the sanction it does 
impose at this time is that the court specifically finds that Mrs. Anderson does not 
come to court with clean hands. She has not compl ed with the orders of the 
court. She has not provided the information regard ng to [sic] the children to the 
Special Master. The court does not make this finding lightly and would not make 
this finding, it [sic] it were not seriously concerned ^bout her continued conduct in 
not obeying the orders of the court. ... 
Dated this day of , 20091 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
6. (Counter #32:45) It appears from the record that counsel for Mrs. Anderson, Mr. 
Nathan Wall, and Mrs. Anderson had difficulty on occasion coming to court and complying with 
the directives of the court. There comes a time (33:10) when the Commissioner must take action 
for failure to comply with the court's order. (33:45) 
a. Mrs. Anderson did not appear for the hearing on June 11, 2008. 
b. Mrs. Anderson was held in contempt. (Hearing July 14, 2008) (See 
Docket, page 18, Order signed and filed 11/4/08). 
c. Mrs. Anderson did not deliver the $7,000 to Mr. Anderson as ordered by 
the court and as ordered by the Commissioner, and it does not appear there is any claim 
in the record that she complied in any other respect to the prior orders. 
d. Mr. Nathan Wall did not file his affidavit in support of his motion. (See 
Docket, page 24) 
e. Mr. Nathan Wall did not attend the hearing on January 6, 2009 before 
Judge McDade. 
f. Mr. Nathan Wall did not file an order outlining the issues to be heard for 
the hearing on 18 August 2009. 
7. (Counter # 38:22) The court has previously bifurcated the divorce, and a decree 
of divorce was entered. Mrs. Anderson's position at this hearing, 18 August 2009, is that the 
court should take evidence to set aside the default previously entered, and that the default was 
inappropriately entered. (38:42) Mr. Anderson's position is that Mrs. Anderson may not address 
the $7,000, or any other issue, for the reason her default was takeiji. (39:28) 
8. Mrs. Anderson was ordered, on 17 October, 2008, |to deliver $7,000 to Mr. 
Anderson. A few days later this money was received by Deborah Anderson. The court finds the 
Order of 17 October 2008 by Judge McVey is clear. Mrs. Anderson did not comply with the 
court's order. (51:48,52:11, 52:55, 55:05) 
9. Commissioner Patton also directed that the money [was to be immediately 
transferred to Mr. Kelly Anderson. (55:05) {See Docket page 17) She did not comply with that 
order. 
10. Regarding the issue of whether or not Mr. Young Communicated with Mr. Nathan 
Wall, Mr. Young requested a copy of the disc on October 27, 2008. A copy of the Order was 
mailed to Mr. Wall on 30 October, 2009. It is worthy to note that the order mailed to Mr. Wall 
on 30 October, 2009 contained the counter numbers from the disq. It would not have been 
possible to have those counter numbers in the order if Mr. Young had not ordered, obtained, and 
reviewed the disc before he submitted the order to Mr. Wall on the 30th day of October, 2008. 
Furthermore, on 30 October 2008 Mr. Young filed a Motion for Immediate Review of the 
Recommendation and Order (Hearing Date October 27, 2008), supported by his Affidavit date 
30 October, 2008, which provided that he had reviewed the disc. (See attached Exhibit I) 
11. The court, in the hearing of 18 August, 2009, intended to afford Mr. Wall every 
opportunity to persuade the court why the recommendation of Commissioner Patton should be 
reversed. However, the court had difficulty in finding a reason why the order should be set 
aside. (1:01:50) There appears to be a lack of responsibility on Mr. Wall's part and Mrs. 
Anderson's part. It is difficult for the court to find a reason why the court should set the default 
aside. (01:01:50) The problem is the lack of follow through by Mrs. Anderson. (01:05:05) 
Upon reviewing the record it is clear to the court why the Commissioner recommended Mrs. 
Anderson's default be entered. 
12. The court affirms the Recommendation striking Mrs. Anderson's pleadings and 
entering her default. (01:09:35, 01:12:47) 
13. The court further outlines below the reason for the entry of the default and the 
lack of follow through by Mrs. Anderson and her attorney, Nathan Wall. (Disc #2 00:45) 
14. The recommendation that Mrs. Anderson's pleadings stricken is affirmed. (Disc 
#2 11:10,12:15,14:50, 17:03) 
16. The history is clear from the record. Mrs. Anderson has not complied with court 
orders in the following particulars: (Disc #211:13-11:25) 
A. Mrs. Anderson requested that the hearing set before June 11, 2008, be 
continued. 
B. Notwithstanding the Commissioner's ruling in Mr. Wall's favor that the 
case should be continued to June 11, 2008, Mrs. Anderson did not attend the hearing on 
June 11, 2008. The Commissioner again continued the hearing to July 14, 2008, with a 
warning that if Mrs. Anderson did not appear a warrant for her arrest would issue for her 
failure to appear. {See Docket page 11). 
C. Mrs. Anderson has been found in contempt) of court. (See Docket re 
hearing July 14, 2008, page 10). Mrs. Anderson has been found to have appeared before 
the court with unclean hands. (See page 12 of the Docket). 
D. Mrs. Anderson did not comply in any particular with the order from 
September 8, 2008. 
E. Mrs. Anderson did not comply with the or4er of Judge McVey of 17 
October, 2008 and the Order of Commissioner Patton of 2[7 October, 2009. (See Exhibit 
J). 
F. After the children were removed from Mrs. Anderson's custody (her 
parental rights have been subsequently terminated) she requested, on October 27, 2008, a 
continuance of the October 27, 2008 hearing. Her requestl for a continuance was denied. 
A further hearing was scheduled for 15 December 2008. (Disc #2 32:41) It has been 
noted earlier that notice of that hearing was provided by the court on October 24th, and 
December 5th, and that counsel was personally served on 9 December, 2008. Mrs. 
Anderson and her attorney failed to attend the 15 December 2008 hearing, and her 
pleadings were stricken. 
G. On January 6,2009 a hearing was scheduled before Judge McDade for 
bifurcation. Neither Petitioner nor her counsel was present However, Mr. Young asked 
the court to reach Mr. Wall by phone, and after the phone pall the court granted the 
bifurcation. (See Docket page 20) 
17. The docket reflects that on April 8,2009 an evideritiary hearing was scheduled for 
June 2, 2009 at Mrs. Anderson's request. {See Docket, page 25). Mrs. Anderson and her 
attorney asked the court to continue the June 2, 2009 hearing. The court granted the motion to 
continue the hearing and directed that Mr. Nathan Wall prepare an order outlining issues that 
were to be presented at the hearing which was then scheduled for August 10, 2009. {See Docket, 
page 27). Mr. Wall failed to prepare that order. 
23. Mr. Young, in preparing this Order, has been specifically authorized to go 
through the record, and set forth the facts in the record in support of this order. (Disc #2 4:50, 
11:20) 
24. To summarize, Mrs. Anderson's objection to the attorney's fees is denied. Mrs. 
Anderson's objection to the Ruling of 20 January, 2008 is denied, and her motion to set aside the 
default is denied. (Disc #2 18:59, 31:50) 
25. The Special Master is released. (Disc #2 20:35) 
26. Judgment of SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($7,000.00) is entered in favor 
of Mr. Anderson. (Disc #2 33:55) 
Dated this 2?day of CJdTohtf , 2009. 
BY THlE COURT: 
Jm vlJJ. & \H. R£o A'^ 
D J. MCDA 
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Nathan Wall 
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